An Economic Analysis of the Confidential Obligation of Attorney and Prescription of Prosecution

Translated title of the contribution: 法律追诉时效制度的经济分析: 挑战中外法学界主流观点

Enfu Cheng, 管 文杰

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper is an economical study of the rationality of the confidential obligation of attorney and prescription of prosecution.Through the behavior analysis centering on the cost -income related to the parties involved, this paper concludes that the confidential obligation of attorney and prescription of prosecution can not realize the maxim of judicial proceeds at a low level of private and social costs, that is , these two rules result in the low efficiency of the judicial resource allocation .
Translated title of the contribution法律追诉时效制度的经济分析: 挑战中外法学界主流观点
Original languageChinese (Simplified)
Pages (from-to)72-83+98
Issue number5
Publication statusPublished - 2005


  • Economics of Law
  • (Economic Analysis of Law
  • (Law and Economics


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